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Abstract 
Transparency in governance in general, and in public procurement in particular, has become the focus of 
lawmakers and civil society in preventing corruption among other objectives. In this paper, the relevance of the 
principle of transparency in public procurement has been espoused using a framework of definitions and reviews 
of purpose and importance of public procurement transparency. Specifically, the agency theory has been 
deployed to explain the purpose and importance of public procurement transparency. Through this the centrality 
of the principle in the fight against public procurement corruption has been confirmed. Although this essay 
espouses the position that there cannot be corruption-free procurement system without transparency, it has been 
argued that, despite its importance and attempts at legislating for it by many regimes, there have been difficulties 
in practice at achieving complete transparency. 
Keywords: Public Procurement Transparency, Why Public Procurement Transparency? Transparency and 
Corruption,  
 
1. Introduction 
Various commentators on modern systems of governance have professed the principle of transparency as a key 
factor in promoting good governance. It has been generally known for some time now that public entities are 
obligated to be transparent not only because the law may require it but also because of the real benefits provided 
by transparent systems of governance (Issing, 2005). The significance of transparency is exemplified in the 
extent to which every significant institution goes to operate a press office in recent times (Issing, 2005). 
In public procurement, the principle of transparency has been recognised by legislators, government officials, 
procurement practitioners, academics and professionals alike as a necessary condition for reducing corruption 
(Jeppesen, 2010 & Bovis, 2009). But what does public procurement transparency mean? Is the principle of 
transparency that relevant in the system for acquiring goods, services and works for the public? If the principle 
of transparency is considered relevant and important, why is transparency in a public procurement system not 
absolute and sometimes difficult to achieve? An attempt has been made to provide answers to these questions in 
this essay. 
 
2. The Meaning of Public Procurement Transparency 
In its generic form, transparency has been defined as “openness, honest visibility and ready accessibility to 
information” about individuals, businesses and government entities (Rawlins, 2008). In principle, transparency 
requires that people at the helm of governance, be they public officials or managers and directors of companies 
and organisations operate in an open and honest manner, such that observers are enabled to easily see through 
their activities (Rawlins, 2008). Where there is transparency, officials consciously reveal in a readily accessible 
manner, true, adequate, useful and balanced information such as would enable interested parties to form 
informed opinions about the organizations they are interested in (Wakefield and Walton 2010). Transparency is 
not achieved only by making information available. Availability of information must be accompanied by 
relevance, accuracy, timeliness, predictability and comprehensibility which are necessary conditions for it to 
meet the standard definition of transparency (Wakefield and Walton 2010). 
Where there is no transparency, there is opacity. There is opacity where officials are prohibited from releasing 
information by means of official code of secrecy or where they deliberately act under cover. Between 
transparency and opacity lies a continuum of a grade of transparency that Wakefield and Walton (2010) have 
dubbed translucency. Translucency represents a condition in which full disclosure of information is not 
considered appropriate and therefore information may be released just enough to “inform, guide, and engage 
key” stakeholders. 
The concept of transparency connotes conscious release of all conceivable information by the holder, whether as 
government official, business or government entity or even a private individual, to those for whom it is relevant. 
However, in practice, the definition of transparency that implies unfettered and complete openness may not be 
appropriate because of ethical, legal and logistical constraints. As a result of these constraints, the meaning of 
transparency may be restricted to the release of information that is ethically and legally allowed (Rawlins 2008). 
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The need may arise to distinguish between voluntary transparency and involuntary transparency. An example of 
voluntary transparency is where an individual, who, although is entitled to privacy as a fundamental right may 
decide for personal reasons to open up and volunteer to provide information to others. Involuntary transparency 
often occurs in governance where it may be compelled by the law or regulation because of its implication for 
good governance. Generally, governments and organizations may strive to provide information that is true and 
honest as a moral obligation and a virtue for good government (Lord 2006). Moreover, where the need for 
transparency becomes a matter of public interest, laws or regulations may be formulated to compel it. Although 
involuntary transparency (i.e. that compelled by law or regulation) may be more relevant in public procurement, 
in practice, voluntary transparency is required to make transparency more meaningful and practicable.  
As applied to public procurement, the principle of transparency has been described as the attributes of a public 
procurement system that enable all relevant stakeholders to be conscious of the processes and procedures leading 
to the award and the management of public contracts (Wittig, 2005 & Bertόk, 2005). The relevant public 
procurement stakeholder may be an official of the procurement entity acting on behalf of government; a business 
sector representative either as contractor, supplier, consultant, prospective contractor, supplier or consultant; a 
civil society organisation or a member of the public at large. Under a transparent system stakeholders are made 
to know or are empowered to find out what is going on in a public procurement process if they so wish. Thus, in 
a transparent public procurement system all participants have access to reliable, accurate, relevant, complete and 
timely information on the procurement process (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009; Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development and World Bank, 2006). Such a system provides sufficient publicity for contract opportunities, 
the terms of engagement governing the procurement process including the procedures at all stages, the qualifying 
requirements for participation in the process and the criteria for taking the award decision (Evenett & Hoekman, 
2003 & Arrowsmith, 2011a). 
To enable transparency in the public procurement system, the contract management processes should be well-
documented and widely publicised in a manner that ensures easy accessibility to all information by all the 
stakeholders. Moreover, such a system should ensure that the award decisions are based on a widely publicised 
set of criteria and the winner’s name and prices are published. It should also provide a stress-free system for 
verifying compliance with procedures (Evenett & Hoekman, 2003 & Arrowsmith, 2011a). The system should 
also provide an opportunity for rectifications and restitutions in case of proven compliance deviations (Evenett & 
Hoekman, 2003 & Arrowsmith, 2011a). A public procurement system that enables transparency must provide 
information on what a player in the procurement process should know and do in seeking award of a government 
contract. As a principle, in a transparent public procurement system, decisions are based on rules rather than 
discretion by officials.  
In a transparent system all prospective suppliers and contractors have equal opportunity of being selected in a 
competitive manner. The OECD-World Bank methodology prescribes it as good practice to ensure that only 
firms with proven record of guilt for corruption (or disqualified as a result of legal “prohibition of commercial 
relations with the country of the participant” or adherence to the UN Security Council Sanction) can be excluded 
from participating in a public procurement activity (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
and World Bank, 2006). 
The practical implication of the principle of public procurement transparency is accessibility to all information 
regarding the laws, procedures, regulations and the existence of procurement opportunities (Bertόk, 2005) and 
this should be achieved by putting in place mechanisms right from the commencement of the process of the 
procurement activity that will make the whole world aware of what, how and when the government proposes to 
buy. Transparency should continue to reflect fully throughout all the stages of public procurement up to the 
completion of the process, from preparation, through solicitation, award, management, invoicing to payment.  
But accessibility to information is not a sufficient condition for transparency. Participants must understand the 
information and must have the capacity to react appropriately to what they get to know (Lindstedt and Naurin, 
2005). Such information must be comprehensive, simple and easy to understand (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009), 
providing avenues for clarifications. Therefore a transparent system should give ample opportunities for the 
education of participants (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). 
In principle, the definition of transparency could be stretched to include bringing visibility to all stakeholders, 
insiders and outsiders alike, to the extent that they are substantial and useful to them (Wakefield and Walton 
2010). However, Schooner et al. (2008) have stated that when used in relation to public procurement, 
transparency should rather emphasise the provision of opportunity to those outside the public procurement 
process (outsiders) to see into its procurement activities, since by definition, insiders (public procurement 
officials) are already beneficiaries of information asymmetry. Indeed, in practice, the insiders are believed to be 
in command of the information on procurement activities to the near exclusion of other stakeholders (La Chimia 
et al., 2011 & Trepte, 2005). Transparency will enable the outside stakeholders to look into the processes leading 
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up to the acquisition for the public (Schooner et al, 2008). But this writer is in agreement with some other 
authorities on public procurement who posit that transparency should apply equally to all stakeholders, whether 
as insiders or outsiders (Wakefield and Walton 2010, Beth, 2005, Trepte, 2005 & Wittig, 2005). The principles 
of transparency require that all stakeholders, be they officials of the procurement entity, business sector 
representatives, civil society or the government, should be given appropriate and proportionate doses of 
information. Indeed transparency must manifest among all stakeholders in any particular procurement activity 
since the relevance of the concept of transparency may be appreciated from the peculiar perspective of each 
group (La Chimia et al., 2011) since they all suffer from one kind of information asymmetry or the other (Trepte, 
2005).  
 
3. The Relevance of Transparency in a Public Procurement System 
The relevance of transparency in public procurement may be explained by the agency problem. Whenever there 
is an agency relationship, the agency problem arises (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) because the agent always has 
monopoly over certain information which he can exploit to his personal benefit against the interest of the 
principal. Layers of principal-agent relationship exist in the public procurement process. For example the 
politician in government who uses public funds to procure for public good acts as an agent of the citizens who 
are the eventual principals as they vote to elect the politician into power. Very often the power of the citizenry to 
hold the politician accountable may coalesce into civil society organisations who may act to exact that authority 
on their behalf. But the government as a buyer uses its agents, the public procurement officials in the actual 
process of buying. In this regard the officials become the agents of government.  
Public procurement officials, because of their strategic position in the public procurement process, are arguably 
the controllers (and in many cases, if not restrained, may be the monopolists) of information on procurement 
activity from the planning phase through the contract award process to contract management stage (La Chimia et 
al., 2011). In public procurement, it is the problem of this “information asymmetry” that may accentuate the 
agency problem.  
A “resourceful, evaluative and maximizing agent” would want to benefit from the agency relationship against 
the interest of the principal taking advantage of the information asymmetries (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). On the 
other hand an evaluative, discerning, objective and maximising principal would put in place measures that would 
minimize the agency problem. One of these measures is the requirement by the principal that the agent accounts 
for his stewardship and this is required to be done manifestly. The principals would require transparency in this 
accountability process which would enable them to effectively control and monitor the agents. But on the part of 
the agents, transparency is not only required to monitor and control them, it is also required to assist them in the 
performance of their duty. For example, procurement officials, agents, may need information on the procurement 
laws and regulations as a means to ensure effective management of the procurement process (Trepte, 2005) in 
the performance of that duty.  
Similar information asymmetries may exist between the procurement officials and the business sector 
participants in the public procurement process. By the stretch of the agency argument, it can be inferred that the 
business sector participants, as agents of development, are also agents of government and therefore agents of the 
citizens. The principle of transparency therefore requires that relevant information about the business sector 
participants is accessible to such stakeholders as civil society, procurement officials or even to some extent other 
businesses. The procurement officials need to have access to information on business sector participants and the 
market conditions to enable them take sound, objective and informed procurement decisions (Trepte, 2005). On 
the other hand, the business sector participants would require access to information controlled by the officials to 
enable them participate fully in available business opportunities and to meaningfully engage in any protest 
process thereby effectively holding procurement officials accountable. In the case of civil society, they would be 
interested in information that will enable them to assess the transparency, fairness and the economy of the 
procurement process.  
In all the above relationships, transparency will ensure that the actions of the stakeholders that could otherwise 
be hidden away from each other are rather made easily discernible and verifiable (Trepte, 2005). The main 
purpose of transparency therefore is to promote openness in the public procurement system so that all the 
stakeholders will be enabled to have unhindered access to information about the procurement activities and 
thereby reduce potential public procurement corruption. Generally, transparency, and the resultant access to 
information enables relevant stakeholders to participate meaningfully in the procurement activity and in the 
process, facilitates complaint procedures, enables monitoring and accountability and thereby put corruption in 
check (Strand, 2010). 
Bovis (2009) has named the principle of transparency among the most essential and notable principles of any 
system of public procurement. For this reason, transparency is considered a major component of good public 
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procurement practice which, if applied properly, can lead to reduced corruption (Jeppesen, 2010 & Bovis, 2009). 
Lack of transparency is an enabling environment for corruption. Indeed corruption flourishes in opacity 
(Schooner et al., 2008), but transparency provides the searchlight which serves to expose the shadowy public 
procurement corruption which otherwise can blossom in phenomenal proportions. Since in a transparent system 
there is limited scope for discretion by procurement officials, there is virtually no need for participants to bribe 
officials before winning contracts and it becomes unprofitable to collude (Ohashi, 2009). Again, when the 
players in a public procurement system are aware of the existence of transparency, the fear that they may be 
exposed and likely punished will compel them to desist from corrupt practices (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). The 
2004 Global Forum identified opacity in public procurement to be a major challenge in the effort to bring 
integrity to public procurement (Burton, 2005). Hence transparency has been recognized by the OECD as a 
major pre-requisite for enhancing integrity and deterring corruption in public procurement (Beth, 2005). As 
estimated by Pieroni and d'Agostino (2009) the absence of transparency yielded more corruption in Africa and 
transition economies. The corollary is that transparency can lead to reduced corruption in Africa.  
Furthermore, transparency enables stakeholders and society at large to ask appropriate questions, monitor 
progress and subject the procurement process to scrutiny. Thus transparency provides appropriate social audit 
trail. In a transparent system, participants have the confidence and assurance that when the system is subjected to 
scrutiny at anytime, it can be seen to be capable of ensuring that nothing improper had occurred (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development and World Bank, 2006). The openness, equality, equity, simplicity 
and fairness that are generated by transparency enable competitive tendering which in turn lead to reduced public 
procurement corruption.  
Various authorities (professionals, academics, World bodies etc) whose pronouncements matter on public 
procurement matters are in agreement on the assumption that transparency bears indirect relationship to 
corruption {Wittig, 2005, Beth, 2005, Schooner et al, 2008, Bertόk, 2005, the World Bank (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development and World Bank, 2006), the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2009), the Procurement Lawyers' Association (PLA) (Procurement Lawyers' 
Association, 2010), (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009) and Arrowsmith, 2011b}. An empirical testimony of this 
relationship is also provided in Brunnetti and Weder (2003) who concluded that the more transparent the system 
of procurement, the less corruption there tends to be and vice versa. Consequently these bodies and many other 
donor institutions and countries have made improvement in transparency a major area of concern in bringing 
reduced corruption to the public procurement systems of the beneficiary countries, particularly the developing 
ones. In Finland, the role of transparency in the public procurement process is regarded as so important and 
significant that, most of the relevant documents in the public procurement process, particularly the tender 
documents and those relating to the actual award decision are classified as non-confidential and therefore are 
accessible to the wider public (International Legal Group, 2010).  
Apart from checkmating corruption and enhancing integrity, there are other benefits accruing from improved 
transparent procurement systems. Transparency provides an effective means to eliminate, identify or correct 
impropriety and waste in the procurement system (Jeppesen, 2010 & Wittig, 2005). Transparent procurement 
procedures can lead to a more efficient allocation of resources as a result of increased competition. Moreover, 
transparency enhances efficiency in the procurement system which eventually results in higher quality 
procurement. As tenderers get to have access to more information about the requirement and the procurement 
environment they are enabled and positioned to provide better solutions with positive effect on efficiency and 
value for money. Good quality procurement and efficient resource allocation will in turn lead to budgetary 
savings for governments.  
Transparency can also help attract more investment by reducing the risk of doing business. As more businesses 
take advantage of the openness, transparency and associated competition for public contracts, business 
opportunities become more predictable whilst businesses become more confident in taking risks. Another 
important welcoming effect of transparency is that by enhancing competition it forces tenderers to show their 
true values thereby giving rise to lower contract prices (Estache and Iimi, 2009). Analysis by Ohashi (2009) on 
the effect of transparency on government expenditure in Japan revealed a reduction of procurement cost by up to 
8% with improvement in transparency. 
It is worth noting that transparency, as applied to governance in general, is an ingredient for ensuring 
participatory democracy. As the activities of public officials are made open to stakeholders, the latter are 
empowered to make positive and meaningful contribution to the process of governance. Furthermore, as the 
governed get convinced that their participation is assured, they tend to accept the process of governance and 
thereby are encouraged to internalise the process and outcomes of governance. 
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4. Is absolute Transparency always Desirable and Allowable? 
Although the positive relationship between transparency and reduced corruption is not in doubt, in practice 
absolute transparency may not be always desirable, necessary or even allowable. In the first place, if 
transparency is conceptualized as absolute, implying a requirement to provide every conceivable piece of 
information the decision making process will run into implementation hiccups as “the sheer volume of 
information” can choke the communication channel and overwhelm recipients (Lord, 2006). Indeed, “the costs 
of procuring and processing” more information, may sometimes not improve the utilitarian expectations of users 
(Blackwell, 1953) and may sometimes not be appropriate on cost-benefit basis. Moreover, under certain 
conditions and circumstances it may not be ethically, legally and logistically appropriate to disclose information 
(Wakefield and Walton 2010). The concept of transparency therefore may be evaluated within the boundaries of 
ethical, legal and logistical constraints. The existence of laws that prohibit the release of certain information on 
the basis of confidentiality, privacy and national security may be grounded in this reasoning. It is submitted that 
in practice, the existence of ethical, legal and logistic constraints render the search for absolute transparency an 
exercise in futility and hence a mere academic exercise. 
Again, in practice unmitigated transparency may expose the transparent entity to several risks since one cannot 
be sure of what the holder of information will do with it. Naturally, holders of certain information are tempted to 
hide them (Rawlins, 2008) unless the coercive force of the law is applied to make them available.  
But in some cases, officialdom may take conscious steps to keep information out of the reach of stakeholders. In 
certain circumstances operators of the system may be reluctant in allowing transparency for the simple reason 
that opacity will further personal and selfish interest and enable them to cover same. Indeed this may happen 
under autocratic systems, where officialdom, including civil servants and procurement officials may benefit from 
opacity. In reality, not every entity found preaching the need to be transparent may be genuinely interested in it 
(Wakefield and Walton 2010). Some may therefore employ all resources at their disposal including subterfuge to 
reduce transparency. Sometimes they can go to the extent of gagging free press and civil society and suppressing 
opposition in general. In some cases laws that enable transparency are resisted and reasons are found to shroud 
information under official secrecy regulations. Even under some democratic dispensations transparency may be 
ignored using flimsy justifications (Vishwanath & Kaufmann, 2001). 
With reference to transparency as it affects public procurement, the increased knowledge associated with 
transparency may prove counterproductive. According to Jenny (2005) unmitigated transparency may breed anti-
competitive practices, facilitate tacit collusion among the tenderers and thereby foment corruption. Under certain 
circumstances, the bureaucracy associated with the need to provide more information may indeed assist bribe 
givers to identify potentially corrupt officials (Bac, 2001). Bac (2001) argues that, this may facilitate corruption 
by enabling easy identification of people with whom “connection” may be established for the purpose of corrupt 
practices. In addition, knowledge acquired by potentially corruptible officials through transparency measures 
will enable them to learn the “ways and means” of perfecting and promoting the art of corruption. 
Moreover, transparency for the sake of it is not a final-one-stop cure for the corruption in procurement 
syndrome. It must be supported by other corruption-reducing imperatives including assurance of effective 
competition and efficiency in managing public resources (Beth, 2005). Nowadays, as indicated by policy 
developments and experience in advanced countries spearheaded by the United States, the OECD and WTO, and 
reflected in “internationally shared norms”, effective competition is being maintained through the international 
trade liberalisation crusade (Anderson and Kovacic, 2009).  
In addition, sometimes unmitigated transparency may be at variance with other requirements of good 
governance. It is therefore important to establish an appropriate balance between transparency and other tenets of 
good governance by ensuring that information is released with due regard to established rules (Wittig, 2005). 
Thus absolute, unmitigated transparency may not be always desirable. The degree of transparency and openness 
should be adapted accordingly to suit the nature, status and value of recipient of information, the stage of the 
procurement cycle, the sensitivity of information, the size of the contract and the nature of the item to be 
procured. Therefore it becomes necessary to time the release of information to suit the nature, status and value of 
recipients. 
Sometimes the need to protect confidentiality and sensitivity of information may make some level of opacity 
appropriate. Thus when the need arises legal provisions may be used to restrict disclosure of certain information 
if it would run contrary to the law, impede law enforcement, against public interest, prejudice the commercial 
interest of the parties or inhibit fair competition as provided in Section28 (4a) of the Public Procurement Law of 
Ghana (Act 663). Restrictions may be placed on the extent of disclosures of information to outsiders when they 
are considered sensitive or confidential as in the typical case of open tenders where detailed content of tenders 
containing commercial, technical and strategic secrets may not be disclosed to competitors. Confidentiality in 
this case will create a level playing field for participants, prevent collusion, enhance corruption control without 
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the attendant bureaucratic bottlenecks in the system (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, 2008), protecting the interest of participants in the process.  
Again, procurement activities requiring urgency as in emergencies during natural disasters cannot wait for the 
organisation of competition and there may be the tendency towards less transparency. In such exigencies as may 
be the case in extreme urgency or national security, full competition may not be feasible but sub-competitive 
alternative procedures like sole sourcing and restricted tendering that are normally resorted to in such cases may 
actually promote opacity. It is advisable if reduced transparency becomes necessary, that risks to integrity are 
checkmated by effective monitoring and control mechanisms. These should include they implementation a well 
publicised rules and conditions in making such exceptions.. 
Sometimes benefits from full disclosure may not be worth the cost associated with it simply because of the value 
and nature of the contract. Careful balance would have to be drawn between the expectations of full transparency 
and other considerations, like expediency, efficiency and value for money.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper the principle of Transparency has been shown to be relevant in the process of acquiring goods, 
service and works as a function of modern governance using the agency theory. It has been argued that, 
eventually, the relevance of transparency will lie not only in its capacity to bring openness to stakeholders and 
thereby check actual corruption and reduce perceived corruption but also to serve other important purposes 
including: bringing efficiency to the public procurement business through the elimination, identification or 
correction of impropriety and waste in the procurement system, the reduction of procurement cost, bringing 
down contract prices and improving value for money. 
It is therefore not surprising that anti-corruption measures in public procurement are built around the principle of 
transparency. But transparency is not an all cure remedy to corruption. Over reliance on transparency may not be 
always appropriate as it may also have counterproductive tendencies under certain circumstances. Moreover, anti 
corruption advocates must look out for threats to transparency arising from actions by people in authority, whose 
nefarious activities may be exposed by the light of transparency.  
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